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I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions∗
A. Issues
This memorandum addresses the weight that the Trial Chamber should attach to the

evidence of co-perpetrators. The term co-perpetrator includes several types of witnesses; such
as, those already convicted, co-defendants, those awaiting trial and those not yet indicted. This
memorandum refers to all testifying co-perpetrators as accomplices, which is the term used by
the majority of jurisdictions.
The memorandum compares the rules and cases on criminal procedure as applied to
accomplice testimony in several different jurisdictions, including the U.S. federal system, several
U.S. states, England, Ireland, Canada, India, Australia, South Africa, Swaziland, Italy, Norway,
France, Germany, Kenya, Uganda, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter
referred to as “ICTR”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(hereinafter referred to as “ICTY”). The memorandum explores the definition of an accomplice,
the purpose behind a cautionary rule for admission, the application of cautionary rules in
different jurisdictions and a proposal for the weight that the Chamber should apply to the
testimony of an accomplice.
B. Summary of Conclusions
The Trial Chamber of the ICTR has applied a liberal standard to admitting evidence. The
Chamber has held that it has the authority to determine the weight and probative value that it will
attach to each piece of evidence and is not bound by any rule of corroboration.1 Given this

∗

ISSUE: Prepare a comparative study of the weight to be attached to the evidence of co-perpetrators in civil,
common law and international criminal law systems. Consider and discuss the ICTY decision in The Prosecutor v.
Kordic & Cerkez, Case no. IT-95-14/2 – PT Judgment, TC, 26 Feb 2001.

1

The Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment, TC, 27 January 2000, ¶ 46. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 12].

1

holding, the Trial Chamber should accord accomplice testimony the same scrutiny that it applies
to other evidence, finding that the Trial Chamber is free to attach its own probative value to the
accomplice testimony.
The arrangement of the Trial Chamber as a judicial panel provides another reason for the
finding that accomplice testimony is to be weighed similar to any other piece of evidence. The
ICTR’s use of a judicial panel, rather than the common law’s jury system, facilitates its ability to
attach probative value to the evidence. Typically, in common law systems, the judge must warn
the jury of convicting on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The purpose of this
warning is to draw the jury’s attention to the fact that the witness may be motivated by selfinterest and may not be a credible witness. In a system utilizing a judicial panel, it is near
redundant for the panel to instruct itself on the dangers of accomplice testimony. The Chamber
is reminded of the dangers of accepting accomplice testimony through practice, experience and
more specifically, objections by the defense regarding the credibility of the witness. Such
objections bring the panel’s attention to the issue of witness credibility and may serve as a
sufficient warning to the panel. Therefore, the Trial Chamber should determine that it is free to
attach its own weight to the testimony of accomplices and should do so with regard to the
dangers of accepting such testimony.

II.

Factual Background in the ICTR
The determination of the weight to attach to accomplice testimony arises in the ICTR out

of the mass number of Hutus who took part in the plan to exterminate the Tutsis. Given the great
number of Hutus involved in the attack, there remain few uninterested witnesses available for
trial. Therefore, if the Trial Chamber accepts a broad definition of accomplice, the witnesses
providing the testimony on the details of the widespread attack will be accomplices. On the

2

other hand, this is the nature of accomplice testimony. Typically, the only witnesses able to
testify about the details of the crime are those who participated in the crime. Therefore, the use
of accomplice evidence to prove the details of the attack on the Tutsis is inevitable.
Furthermore, many of the crimes that the ICTR is prosecuting involve widespread,
systematic attacks or plans to commit a crime under the ICTR statute. In order to prove a plan
for widespread attack it is necessary to show the common intent among the perpetrators. Thus,
accomplice evidence is necessary to prove the specific elements of the crime. Accomplices
provide the inside knowledge required to effectively show a plan, conspiracy, or intent to commit
the crime. Therefore, the court’s acceptance of an accomplice as a credible witness is critical to
securing a conviction.

III.

Fundamental Evidentiary Principles Governing Accomplice
Testimony

Before proceeding to the treatment of accomplice evidence in national and international
forums, it is important to explore the evidentiary rules that apply to testimonial evidence already
in place in the ICTR. Rule 89(A) of the ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence states that “the
Chambers shall not be bound by national rules of evidence.”2 In section (B), the Rule explains
that the Chamber “shall apply rules of evidence which will best favor a fair determination of the
matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of
law.”3 Rule 89(C) states that a Chamber “may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to
have probative value.”4

2

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter referred to as “ICTR”), Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Rule 89(A) (May 27, 2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
3

Id. at Rule 89(B).

4

Id. at Rule 89(C).

3

These evidentiary rules are in place to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. The
purpose of such rules is analogous to that of the United States Constitutional right to due process.
Due process guarantees a right to fair procedure and has traditionally operated to exclude
involuntary confessions and unreliable witness testimony.5 The evidentiary exclusions operate
when “customary methods of exposing unreliability such as cross-examination, impeachment
and the jurors’ evaluation of credibility, cannot adequately safeguard a defendant’s interest in
being tried upon reliable evidence.”6 Courts have applied such exclusionary rules in matters
concerning witness credibility.7 Regardless of the accompanying dangers, courts should admit
accomplice testimony. “Courts should not deny juries the opportunity to hear testimony that is
very often decisive and true, nor should they deny society this most useful tool for convicting the
guilty.”8
The ICTR Chambers has set a fairly open policy for the admission of evidence. In The
Prosecutor v. Musema,9 the Trial Chamber held that it is free to assess the relevance and
credibility of each piece of evidence. The Chamber stated that it “may rule on the basis of a
single testimony, if it is relevant and credible.”10 It stated that the Chamber is not bound by any

5

Yvette A. Beeman, Note, Accomplice Testimony under Contingent Plea Agreements, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 800,
803-804 (1987), citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 37].

6

Id. at 804, citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 174, at 496-97 (3d ed. 1984).

7

Id., citing LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 1974) (coerced testimony of witness is unreliable and
should be excluded).
8

Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1, 34 (1992). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 39].

9

Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment, TC, 27 January 2000. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 12].
10

Id. at ¶ 43.
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rule of corroboration and is free to rule solely on testimonies or other evidence.11 The Chamber
found that it is free to make its own assessments of the probative value of the evidence.12
A. Characteristics and Dangers of Accomplice Testimony
The testimony of an accomplice in a criminal proceeding is often critical to obtaining a
conviction because it provides the finder of fact with an inside view of the crime, conspiracy or
joint venture.13 In many cases, accomplice evidence is the case’s strongest, most convincing
evidence because the accomplice is able to provide the factfinder with compelling, first-hand
knowledge of the facts of the crime. 14 An accomplice is often the only witness who is able to
testify in such intricate detail. On the other hand, because the accomplice possesses detailed
knowledge of the crime charged against the accused, false testimony may be deceivingly
convincing. Detailed facts of the crime can mislead the factfinder to believe that the witness is
credible, simply because he is providing insider information.
From this fear of falsification emerged the assumption that an accomplice’s testimony is
inherently untrustworthy.15 As a result, common law courts have concluded that the finder of
fact must be aware of the dangers that accompany accomplice testimony. There are a variety of

11

Id. at ¶ 46.

12

Id.

13

Ann C. Rowland, Effective Use of Informants and Accomplice Witnesses, 50 S.C. L. REV. 679 (1999).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45].
14

Note, Accomplice Testimony and Credibility: Vouching and Prosecutorial Abuse of Agreements to Testify
Truthfully, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1169, n. 1 (1981). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 42].
15

J. Arthur L. Alarcon, Suspect Evidence: Admissibility of Co-conspirator Statements and Uncorroborated
Accomplice Testimony, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 953, 962 (1992). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
36].

5

reasons that would motivate an accomplice to testify falsely.16 The accomplice may be seeking a
reduction in sentence, immunity from prosecution, financial rewards, revenge on the accused, or
elimination of the competition in criminal activity.17
First, an accomplice may testify falsely in an attempt to please the prosecutor and ensure
lenient prosecution in his own case.18 Such testimony of accomplices who receive lenient
treatment is not per se reliable.19
Second, it may be in the accomplice’s interest not only to implicate others but also to
minimize his own role, while exaggerating the roles of his co-conspirators.
Because of an accomplice’s first-hand knowledge of the details of
the criminal conduct charged in the indictment, his or her
testimony concerning the role played by the accused may appear
quite believable, and its veracity can only be challenged by another
accomplice.20
Courts have recognized a natural tendency for an accomplice to attempt to minimize his role by
transferring blame onto the accused. In United States v. Lee,21 the court stated that it is in the

16

People v. Crump, 125 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ill. 1955) (“It is universally recognized that the testimony of an
accomplice is fraught with weaknesses, due to the effect of motives, hope of leniency or benefits, or the effect of
fear threats, hostility, etc.”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

17

Rowland, supra note 13; Declan McGrath, The Accomplice Corroboration Warning, 34 IRISH JURIST 170, 173174 (1999) (accomplice may hope to obtain more favorable treatment by co-operating with the prosecution and
helping them convict the accused; or, tailor his testimony in favor of the prosecution of the prosecution after he has
been granted or offered any degree of immunity), citing R. v. Gibney, [1986] 4 NIJB 1, 5 (C.A.) (“An accomplice
may also be motivated by malice or a desire for revenge towards the person implicated by him.”). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 41].

18

Beeman, supra note 5, at 802.

19

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917), [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15];
United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1306 (7th Cir. 1986). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
30].
20

Alarcon, supra note 15, at 960.

21

506 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1974). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29].

6

accomplice’s own interest to place guilt on the defendant by either shifting the blame from the
accomplice or by complying with a bargain that has been struck with the authorities.22
Third, one of the biggest concerns regarding the falsification of testimony is when the
accomplice has been granted immunity or partial immunity from prosecution. Immunity from
prosecution “creates a powerful inducement for an accomplice to adhere to his or her original
statement to the police implicating the accused even though this may, in fact, have been false.”23
Finally, “an accomplice by definition is a criminal and may be an unreliable witness
because of his moral culpability.”24
In the South African court system, accomplice testimony is to be “treated with a very
definite degree of caution.”25 The purpose behind this cautionary approach was explained in S v.
Hlapezula and Others:26
It is well settled that the testimony of an accomplice requires
particular scrutiny because of the cumulative effect of the
following factors. First, he is a self-confessed criminal. Second,
various considerations may lead him falsely to implicate the
accused, for example, a desire to shield a culprit or, particularly
where he has not been sentenced, the hope of clemency. Third, by
reasons of his inside knowledge, he has a deceptive facility for
convincing description – his only fiction being the substitution of
the accused for the culprit. 27

22

Id. at 123.

23

McGrath, supra note 17, at 173, citing R. v. Chai, [1992] 27 NSWLR 153, 178; People v. Mazure, [1946] I.R. 448
(C.C.A.); R. v. Farler, 8 C & P 106, 108 (1837) (evidence from accomplice who has been granted immunity is less
trustworthy because “when a man is fixed, and knows that his own guilt is detected, he purchases impunity by
falsely accusing others.”).

24

Id. at 174, citing R. v. Green, 1 Craw & Dix CC 158, 159 (Ir. Cir. Cas. 1825).

25

S v. Nkabinde, 1998 (8) BCLR 996 (N), 1998 SACLR LEXIS 17, 37 (April 30, 1998). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

26

Id., quoting S v. Hlapezula and Others, South African Law Reports 1965 (4) S.A. 439 (A), at 440 D-H.

27

Id.
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In recognition of these dangers, the South African court system has subscribed to a set of
cautionary rules that require the court to recognize the dangers of accomplice testimony, while
providing a safeguard to protect against the risks of accepting such testimony.28
Conclusively, accomplice testimony should be viewed with suspicion. Courts have
instructed that the finders of fact “should not evaluate accomplice testimony according to the
same rules that govern more credible witnesses.” 29 By questioning the credibility of accomplice
testimony, courts protect against the potential dangers that may be motivating the accomplice to
exaggerate or testify falsely.30 As stated in Phelps v. United States,31 “A skeptical approach to
accomplice testimony is a mark of the fair administration of justice.”32
B. Arguments Rejecting the Characterizations and Dangers of Accomplice
Testimony
In contrast, the Canadian Supreme Court in R. v. Vetrovec33 rejected the majority of
proclaimed dangers associated with admitting accomplice testimony. First, in response to the
argument that an accomplice may try to save himself by facilitating the conviction of the
accused, the Court stated,
The promise of clemency is not invariably made. It may be that an
accomplice is testifying knowing full well that he in turn will face
prosecution for his role in the crime. In these cases, the essential
cause for mistrust disappears… The influence of the promise of
immunity must depend on the nature of the charge and the
personality of the accomplice. Even in cases where a promise of
28

Id.

29

Crawford v.United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1908). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17].

30

Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 495.

31

252 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1958). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24].

32

Id. at 52.

33

[1982] 1 S.C.R. 811. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
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immunity is offered, it should not always be assumed that the
accomplice cannot be trusted, ‘credibility is a matter of elusive
variety,’ Wigmore said, ‘and it is impossible and anachronistic to
determine in advance that, with or without promise, a given man's
story must be distrusted.’34
The Canadian Supreme Court also rejected the argument that an accomplice has a natural
tendency to minimize his own role in the crime against the accused.
It has also been suggested that an accomplice cannot be trusted
because he will want to suggest his innocence or minor
participation in the crime and to transfer the blame to the shoulders
of others. But again, if we examine this rationale more closely, we
see that it cannot be the foundation for a general rule regarding all
accomplices. Some accomplices do indeed attempt to minimize
their involvement in the crime; but experience has shown this is
not always the case. Logically, where an accomplice openly
acknowledges his participation, there should be no need for a
warning. Further, even when the accomplice claims that he played
a minor role in the crime, this version of the events may be
admitted by the accused. Where the part played by the accomplice
is common ground, there seems little risk that the accomplice is
deliberately fabricating his own participation in order to play up
the guilt of others. In short, this second reason cannot support a
rule affecting all accomplices: credibility will vary with the facts of
the particular case.35
The Canadian court also rejected the theory that an accomplice may
falsely testify and implicate the accused to protect his friends.
But friendship is not the bond which unites associates in crime;
and the accomplice who avows his own guilt, will not feel much
disposition to conceal that of his associates: at least he will not
incur any risk on his account. In my experience I have ever found
it so; the utmost favor that I have ever known an accomplice to
show to any of his companions having been to assign to him a less
prominent part in the transaction, and to make him comparatively
better, by making him less active, than the others. These
considerations have, with me at least, great weight; and therefore,
though I by no means say the case is impossible, I will venture to
34

Id. (citations omitted).

35

Id.

9

assert that it much more rarely happens that an accomplice accuses
an innocent man through malice, than that an unimpeachable
witness accuses an innocent man through mistake.36
The Canadian court’s final argument rejected the notion that an
accomplice is unreliable because he is a self-confessed criminal and is thereby
morally culpable.
First, we accept the testimony of other criminals without
automatically requiring a warning as to their credit. Second, the
'moral guilt' of an accomplice must vary with the nature of the
crime involved. One who is guilty of an assault may be thought to
be more trustworthy than an incorrigible counterfeiter. Yet the
present law makes no distinction between them. Once a witness is
classified as an accomplice, his testimony is automatically
regarded as suspect.37
The court concluded, “None of these arguments can justify a fixed and invariable rule regarding
all accomplices.”38 Therefore, according to the Canadian Supreme Court, an accomplice’s
testimony cannot be pigeonholed into a general category of non-credible witnesses.
C. Conclusions on the Dangers of Accomplice Testimony
The arguments on both sides of the dangers of accomplice testimony carry some degree
of merit. An accomplice may have a stronger motivation to falsify his testimony. Some courts
have begun to deviate from the general principle of using caution in determining credibility to an
approach that presumes the accomplice testimony as not credible. However, it can be just as
prejudicial to make generalizations about the credibility of all accomplice witnesses. The law
rarely makes an absolute generalization on any issue because it recognizes that circumstances are

36

Id. (citations omitted).

37

Id.

38

Id.
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unique in each case. Therefore, a generalization that accomplice witnesses are not credible is too
broad and will overly exclude reliable evidence.
Given these arguments, it is possible for the Trial Chamber to take an approach that falls
in the middle of these two extreme views. The Chamber should recognize that accomplices
might be motivated to exaggerate or falsify their testimony, especially where they will be facing
similar charges before the same Chamber. It is equally important for the Chamber to keep in
mind that accomplices are not the only witnesses that may be motivated to testify untruthfully or
show bias. Therefore, courts should carefully assess the credibility of each witness, including
accomplice witnesses. This assessment should be based on observing the witness’ demeanor and
listening to the testimony both on direct and cross-examination. The Chamber may also use
other direct or circumstantial evidence to support its finding or rejection of the reliability of the
witness.

IV.

Treatment of Accomplice Testimony in National Jurisdictions

In order to effectively determine the weight that the ICTR should attach to accomplice
testimony, it is helpful to look at the treatment of such testimony in national jurisdictions. The
body of law and procedure in common and civil law systems has been tested over time.
Therefore, the insight from these systems can serve as a guide to addressing the concerns that
follow the admission of accomplice testimony. Generally, in the common law system the jury
determines the facts. Thus, the jury determines the weight that will be attached to the testimony
of the accomplice witness. In the civil law system, a judge or judicial panel determines the facts
and evidentiary weights.

11

C. Accomplice Testimony in Common Law Jurisdictions
In common law systems the jury makes the ultimate determination of the weight to be
attached to the accomplice testimony, while the judge guides the jury through the legal
requirements of their decision process. The courts in common law jurisdictions follow a two
step inquiry before making the determination of the weight, which will be attached to the
accomplice testimony. First, the jury must determine if the witness qualifies as an accomplice.
Second, if the witness is an accomplice, there are a number of different procedural elements in
place to ensure that the accused is protected from the aforementioned dangers of the accomplice
testimony.
i. Step One: Determining Who is an Accomplice
The term accomplice is taken from substantive criminal law and refers to “a person who
is in any way involved with another in the commission of a crime, whether as a principal in the
first or second degree or as an accessory.”39 The term accomplice extends to include any person
who is particeps crimins,40 regardless of status as “principal or accessory before or after the fact
or a person committing, procuring or aiding and abetting.”41 Other definitions of accomplice
include: (1) “a person implicated either as a principal or as accessory in the crime under
investigation”;42 (2) “an associate or participator in crime”;43 (3)“one who takes part in a crime
39

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 13 (7th ed. 1999); McGrath, supra note 17, at 174. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 41].
40

Black’s Law Dictionary states that particeps criminis is Latin for “partner in crime.” The definition of the term
particeps criminis is “an accomplice or accessory.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 914 (7th ed. 1999).

41

Davies v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1954] A.C. 378, 379 (H.L.), [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 7]; Medard R. Rwelamira, Corroboration of Accomplice Evidence in Swaziland: Some Thoughts on
Judicial Interpretations and their Implications, 36 J. AFR. L. 52 (1992), citing Philemon Mdluli and Others v. R.,
[1969-72] Swaziland Law Reports 71. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 46].
42

Rwelamira, supra, at 55, quoting WORDS AND PHRASES JUDICIALLY DEFINED, Vol. 1, 83.

43

Id., quoting BELL’S LEGAL DICTIONARY.
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and is privy to the criminal intent (mens rea) of the thing done”;44 and (4)“one who is associated
with another or others in the commission of a crime whether as principal or accessory.”45
Although common law courts have adopted a variety of definitions of the term “accomplice,”
one consistency throughout all of the definitions is that the term “accomplice” remains relatively
broad in scope.
Courts do not require a great degree of complicity to consider a witness an accomplice.46
The definition of accomplice is applied broadly and with purpose, focusing more on the “degree
of participation of the witness in the events grounding the offence charged and his motives to lie
rather than on the technical character of that participation.”47
The English courts have identified three categories of accomplices: (1) persons
participating either as principals or accessories, or persons counseling, procuring, or aiding or
abetting in the actual crime charged;48 (2) the receiver of stolen goods; and (3) persons involved
in other crimes allegedly committed by the accused which are admissible as similar fact
evidence.49

44

Id., quoting STROUD’S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY.

45

Id., quoting THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA.

46

McGrath, supra note 17, at 176, quoting People (AG) v. Carney, [1929] I.R. 19 (C.C.A.); McNee v. Kay, 1942
VLR 520 (SC), [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 41]; Davies, [1954] A.C. at 400, [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 7]; People v. Hudson, 414 N.E.2d 385 (N.Y. 1980). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

47

Id., citing McNee v. Kay, 1942 VLR 520 (SC).
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Davies, [1954] A.C. at 400, [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7]; See Tom Rees, Case
Comment, R. v. Asghar, 1994 CRIM. L. REV. 941 (finding witness charged with lesser offence of violent disorder
qualified as an accomplice where defendant was charged with murder in the same incident). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
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Davies, [1954] A.C. at 400, [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7]; See Carolyn Yates, Accomplice
Evidence, 1984 CRIM. L. REV. 213. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 49].
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The Supreme Court of India has adopted the broadest application of the accomplice
definition and requirements. In Vemireddi and others v. State of Hyderabad,50 the Supreme
Court stated,
[W]here the witness was the only person present at the murder, the
court should want corroboration of his evidence for sustaining the
conviction of the appellants, as it would be unsafe to hand four
people on his sole testimony, unless they felt convinced that he
was telling the truth.51
The court held that the witness must be regarded in law as an accomplice whose testimony must
be corroborated. The court found that “though the witness was not an accomplice, he must be
treated as being ‘somewhat analogous to that of an accomplice though not exactly the same.’”52
Thus, the definition of accomplice as applied by the Supreme Court of India went beyond the
technical definition of accomplice towards the purpose of the definition, which is to ensure the
reliability of testimonial evidence.
In the U.S., “the generally accepted test as to whether a witness is an accomplice is
whether he, himself, could have been indicted for the offense either as a principal or
accessory.”53 This test, like the English test, also applies to an accomplice, whether he is made
an accomplice before or after the crime actually occurs. However, when a question arises
regarding whether a witness is an accomplice or not,
[Initially,] the question of who are accomplices is one of law for
the court when the facts as to the witness’ participation are clear

50

(1956) S.C. R. 342; A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 37; See Naziruddin Ahmed, Accomplice Testimony 48 (M. Mohiuddin Khan,
The Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs 1979), quoting Vemireddi and others v State of
Hyderabad, (1956) S.C. R. 342; A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 37. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
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McClure v. State, 215 S.W.2d 524 (Ark. 1948). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
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and undisputed; when such facts are disputed or susceptible of
different inferences, the question is one of fact for the jury.54
Therefore, when the question arises whether to classify a witness as an accomplice or not, the
determination is one of fact to be submitted to the jury. The degree of credit to be given to a
witness and “the extent, to which his credit is impaired by his apparent relation to the offense on
trial, is for [the jury’s] consideration.”55 In other words, it is for the judge to instruct the jury
whether, in law, a person is capable of being considered as an accomplice and for the jury to
decide whether, in fact, that person is an accomplice.
ii. Step Two: Corroboration, Instructions and Other Requirements
Accompanying Accomplice Testimony
Once it has been established that a witness is an accomplice, the court’s next
determination is the weight that should be given to the testimony. In common law jurisdictions,
the jury makes the ultimate determination of the weight to be attached to accomplice testimony.
In order to protect from the potential dangers of accomplice testimony, the judge in most
common law jurisdictions is required to instruct the jury to view the accomplice testimony with
suspicion. However, courts remain divided on the issue of whether evidence is required to
corroborate the accomplice testimony. The most restrictive approach to accepting accomplice
evidence requires the independent evidentiary corroboration of the accomplice testimony in
order to sustain a conviction. The second approach allows a conviction without corroborating
evidence, as long as the jury is warned of the dangers of accepting accomplice testimony. The

54

Ripley v. State, 227 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Tenn. 1950), [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25];
McGrath, supra note 17, citing Attorney General v. O’Connor (No. 2), 1936 I.R. Jur. Rep. 37 (CCA); Davies, [1954]
A.C. 378.
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Ripley, 227 S.W.2d at 29.
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third approach gives the judge the discretion to determine whether or not to instruct the jury
warning on the dangers of accepting accomplice testimony.
1. Most Restrictive Jurisdictions: Corroboration of Accomplice
Evidence is Required to Sustain a Conviction
The most restrictive rule concerning the admission of accomplice testimony requires the
testimony to be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction. This rule is applied in several U.S.
states.56 For example, the New York statute states, “A defendant may not be convicted of any
offense upon the testimony of an accomplice unsupported by corroborative evidence tending to
connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.”57 This rule limits a judge or jury’s
discretion and assumes that an accomplice witness is likely to testify falsely or exaggerate. The
rule prohibits the admission of accomplice testimony absent corroborating evidence. Thus, the
testimony is presumed unreliable unless other evidence affirmatively corroborates it.
Under the statute, the New York courts require evidence independent of the accomplice’s
testimony, which tends to connect the defendant to the crime in such a way as to assure that the
accomplice is telling the truth. Although this rule seems highly restrictive because the jury may
not convict without corroborative evidence, the New York courts have interpreted the statute as
requiring “only a modicum of such corroborative evidence.”58
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Abrahan Abromovsky, Corroborating Accomplice Testimony, 1994 N.Y. L.J., Criminal Law and Procedure, 3, n.
8 (June 17, 1994) (“The states and territories are Alaska, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana,
Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Dakota and Texas. Seven states and territories,
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Islands and Wyoming.”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35].
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N.Y. [Crim. Proc.] Law § 60.22(1) (2003), [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3]; See Hudson,
414 N.E.2d 385, [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22]; People v. Kress, 31 N.E.2d 898, 902 (N.Y.
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Abromovsky, supra note 56.
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In People v. Breland,59 the court held that the elements of the crime could be proven
through the accomplice’s testimony alone, and “much less evidence and of a distinctly inferior
quality is sufficient to meet the slim corroborative linkage to otherwise independently probative
evidence from accomplices.”60 Thus, the standard to satisfy the corroboration requirement
remains relatively low, “seemingly insignificant matters may harmonize with the accomplice’s
narrative so as to provide the necessary connection between the defendant and the crime.”61 In
Breland, the court found that physical evidence from Emergency Medical Service and police
personnel regarding the location of the victim’s body at the time of the murder sufficiently
corroborated the accomplice’s testimony.62 The Breland court held that the New York statute
requiring corroborative evidence only assures that “the accomplice … offered credible probative
evidence.”63
Swaziland courts follow a similar rule, which requires corroboration to sustain a
conviction. The proviso to § 237 of the Swaziland Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act
requires that the evidence of a single accomplice cannot form the basis of a conviction.64 The
corroboration requirements “would be discharged once it is proved by independent evidence that
the offence was actually committed.”65 The Swaziland judicial system leans toward broad
admissibility of accomplice evidence.
59

631 N.E.2d 577 (N.Y. 1994). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
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Justice Rothwax, Case Commentary, People v. Reich, N.Y. L.J., Court Decisions, pg. 25 (November 1, 1994),
citing Hudson, 414 N.E.2d 385. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
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Abromovsky, supra note 56, citing Breland, 631 N.E.2d at 580.
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Any court which is trying any person on a charge of any offence
may convict him of any offence alleged against him in the
indictment or summons on the single evidence of any accomplice:
Provided that such offence has by competent evidence other than
the single and unconfirmed evidence of such accomplice been
proved to the satisfaction of such court to have been actually
committed.66
Courts in South Africa also follow the requirement that accomplice testimony must be
corroborated in order to sustain a conviction. In S v. Nkabinde,67 the South African High Court
recognized that one accomplice witness Memela “did his best to diminish or play down his role
in the killing of two murder victims.”68 However, the court accepted it as a typical characteristic
of accomplices, stating that it is “the way a human being functions.”69 In light of the multiple
and inconsistent accomplice testimony, the court explained that accomplice testimonies are to be
“treated with a very definite degree of caution.”70 Given, the aforementioned dangers of
accomplice testimony, recognized above by the South African court in Hlapezula, the cautionary
rule requires:

66

(a)

Recognition by the trial court of the foregoing dangers, and

(b)

The safeguard of some factor reducing the risk of a wrong
conviction, such as corroboration implicating the accused in the
commission of the offence, or the absence of gainsaying evidence
from him, or his mendacity as a witness, or the implication by the
accomplice of someone near and dear to him … Satisfaction of the
cautionary rule does not necessarily warrant a conviction, for the
ultimate requirement is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and this

Id.
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Nkabinde, 1998 (8) BCLR 996 (N), 1998 SACLR LEXIS at 37. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
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Id.
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depends upon an appraisal of all the evidence and the degree of the
safeguard aforementioned. 71
The court in Nkabinde applied this rule to a second accomplice witness, stating, “All he need to
have done was testify to the facts as he knew them and simply supplement one sentence
implicating the accused.”72 The court acknowledged that the second witness had a strong motive
to lie and it recognized that parts of his testimony were false. The court applied the cautionary
rule, finding that it could not accept the second witness’ testimony as true because it lacked
corroboration.
2. Factfinder May Convict on Uncorroborated Accomplice
Testimony, When Given an Instruction on the Dangers of
Accomplice Testimony.
The second approach to attaching probative value to accomplice testimony is more
lenient than the first approach. It allows the finder of fact to convict on uncorroborated
accomplice testimony, but requires that the conviction be preceded by an instruction advising the
jury of the dangers of accepting accomplice testimony. This view presupposes that accomplices
are competent witnesses, but safeguards against the dangers of accomplice testimony by
requiring the instruction.73
Jurisdictions adopting this approach include the U.S. federal courts and several U.S. state
courts. These courts have sustained convictions based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony
where the testimony is not incredible or unsubstantiated on its face.74 Even where the
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Id., quoting S v. Hlapezula and Others, South African Law Reports 1965 (4) SA 439 (A), at 440 D-H.
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Id.
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United States v. Rossen, 441 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1971), [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31];
Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 495, [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15]; United States v. Latouf, 132
F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
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Beeman, supra note 5, at 802, citing Haakinson v. United States, 238 F.2d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 1956).
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accomplice is an admitted perjurer, courts have upheld convictions based on uncorroborated
testimony.75 On the other hand, several of these courts have also recognized the importance of
providing the factfinder with a cautionary instruction about the dangers of accomplice testimony.
As a rule of practice, “[c]ourts should instruct juries to consider how easily suspects with inside
knowledge can fabricate testimony and [that there is a] strong incentive for suspects to do so
when their liberty may depend on it.”76 A typical instruction states,
You have heard witnesses who testified that they were actually
involved in planning and carrying out the crime(s) charged in the
indictment. There has been a great deal said about these so-called
accomplice witnesses in the summations of counsel and whether or
not you should believe them.
The government argues … that only people who themselves take
part in criminal activity have the knowledge required to show
criminal behavior by others. For those very reasons, the law
allows the use of accomplice testimony. Indeed it is the law in
federal courts that the testimony of accomplices may be enough in
itself for conviction, if the jury finds that the testimony establishes
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, it is also the case that
accomplice testimony is of such nature that it must be scrutinized
with great care and viewed with particular caution when you
decide how much of that testimony to believe
Let me say a few things that you may want to consider during your
deliberations on the subject of accomplices. You should ask
yourselves whether these so-called accomplices would benefit
more by lying, or by telling the truth. Was their testimony made
up in any way because they believed or hoped that they would
somehow receive favorable treatment by testifying falsely? Or did
they believe that their interests would be best served by testifying
truthfully? If you believe that the witness was motivated by hopes
of personal gain, was the motivation one, which would cause him
to lie, or was it one which would cause him to tell the truth? Did
this motivation color his testimony?

75

Id., citing Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1971); United States v. Miceli, 446 F.2d 236, 258-259
(1971).
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Hughes, supra note 8, at 33.
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In sum, you should look at all the evidence in deciding what
credence and what weight, if any; you will want to give to the
accomplice witnesses.77
Thus, where corroboration is not required to sustain a conviction, the factfinder in U.S. federal
courts should be advised as follows: “Do not convict the defendant based on the unsupported
testimony of such a witness, standing alone, unless you believe his testimony beyond a
reasonable doubt.”78
Generally, U.S. federal courts have held that the aforementioned cautionary jury
instruction is not mandatory; nor, has the failure to instruct the jury been found to be reversible
error.79 However, failure to instruct the jury on the dangers of accomplice testimony has been
found to be reversible error in cases where there was no corroborating evidence and the evidence
of guilt was not overwhelming.80
The courts in the United Kingdom have also adopted the view that the court must instruct
the finder of fact on the dangers of uncorroborated accomplice testimony. In R. v. Baskerville,81
the Court of Criminal Appeal found that there was no question as to the admissibility of
uncorroborated accomplice testimony, “but it has long been a rule of practice at common law for
the judge to warn the jury of the danger of convicting a prisoner on the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice.”82 The Baskerville court added that the judge also has the discretion to advise
77

1-7 Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 7.01 Witness Credibility 7-5 (2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying
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a jury not to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. However, the judge
should point out in these cases that it is within the jury’s legal province to convict on such
testimony alone.83
The House of Lords in Davies v. Director of Public Prosecutions84 affirmed the
Baskerville decision, stating that an accomplice is a competent witness and a conviction based on
uncorroborated accomplice testimony could be supported. Furthermore, it stated that “a judge
may properly direct a jury that they are entitled if they choose to act on such uncorroborated
evidence.”85 The Davies court three propositions offered by the prosecution, holding:
(1)

In a criminal trial where a person who is an accomplice gives
evidence on behalf of the prosecution, it is the duty of the judge to
warn the jury that, although they may convict upon his evidence, it
is dangerous to do so unless it is corroborated.

(2)

This rule, although a rule of practice now has the force of a rule of
law.

(3)

Where the judge fails to warn the jury in accordance with this rule,
the conviction will be quashed, even if in fact there be ample
corroboration of the evidence of the accomplice. 86

Thus, where Baskerville held that an instruction should be given as a rule of practice, Davies
followed by holding that it was now a rule of law and reversible error for the judge not to warn
the jury of the dangers of uncorroborated accomplice testimony.
Although Davies held that the accomplice warning need only be given in the case where
the accomplice is a witness for the prosecution, R. v. Prater87 held that “it was desirable to give a
83
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warning about acting on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, whether the witness
came from the [defendant or the Crown].”88
The judicial system in India, which is based on the English system, adopted the same
principles recognizing the dangers of accepting accomplice testimony. In R. v. Elahee Buksh,89
the High Court of Calcutta found that it is legal to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice.90 However, the Court limited this finding by holding that a trial judge’s failure to
warn the jury of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice was
a misdirection, which mandated a remand.91
The second leading case on the Indian requirements of accomplice testimony is R. v.
Imam Valad Baban.92 In this case, the accomplice witness testified to the three defendants’
participation in a murder. The accomplice’s testimony was corroborated only as to one of the
accused and not to the other two. 93 A second witness, who was not an accomplice, also testified
as to the three defendant’s involvement in the crime, but his evidence was not considered reliable
by the sessions judge due to his prior contradictory statements.94 The High Court held,
Where there were several accused persons implicated by an
accomplice who is corroborated as for some and not as for others,
their practice was to tell the jury that it was safer to require
corroboration as to all the accused, as nothing was easier for the
accomplice than to put an accused in place of the guilty man; and
88

Id.; Yates, supra note 49, at 213.
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tell the jury not to find the prisoners guilty unless the accomplice’s
evidence is corroborated not only on to the crime but also to
implicate each accused in the crime.95
The High Court dismissed the conviction against the defendants, against whom the accomplice
testimony had not been corroborated, holding that they had not been legally convicted.96
The Indian legislature somewhat retracted from the high courts’ holdings when it
introduced the Evidence Act in 1872.97 Sections 114 and 133 of the Evidence Act embody the
entirety of the accomplice testimony statues in Indian law.98 Section 114 states:
The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks
likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of
natural events, human conduct and public and private business in
their relation to the facts of the particular case.99
The statute also provides illustrations for the statute, which state in part,
The Court may presume,
(b) [T]hat an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is
corroborated in material particulars; … but the Court shall also
have regard to such facts as the following in considering whether
such maxims do or do not apply to the particular case before it …
[A]s to illustration (b) A, a person of the highest character is tried
for causing a man’s death by an act of negligence in arranging
certain machinery; B, a person of equally good character who also
took part in the arrangement, describes precisely what was done,
and admits and explains the common carelessness of A and
himself;
[A]s to illustration (b) a crime is committed by several persons, A,
B, and C, three of the criminals are captured on the spot and kept
apart from each other. Each gives an account of the crime
95

Id.
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implicating D, and the accounts corroborate each other in such a
manner as render previous concert highly improbable.100
Section 133 of the Evidence Act also provides guidance on accomplice testimony procedure. It
is to be read in connection with § 114. Section 133 states: “An accomplice shall be a competent
witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds
upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.”101 Both of these sections of the Evidence
Act are permissive in nature, rather than prohibitive. This lends to the inference that they give
the judge more discretion in making his own determinations as to the credibility of the
accomplice. These principles suggest that the Indian judicial system’s treatment of accomplice
testimony departs somewhat from this second approach to accomplice evidence, leaning slightly
towards the third approach, which gives the judge more discretion in applying the accomplice
corroboration rule.
Another slight departure from the second view is applied in Kenya and Uganda, where
varying degrees of corroboration are required of the witness.102 “The principal factors to be
considered when assessing the credibility of accomplices are not only their demeanor and quality
as witnesses but also their relation to the offence charged and the parts they played in connection
therewith.”103 The trial judge may only depart from this general rule where,
[I]t clearly appears that the accomplice evidence is so cogent as to
satisfy the magistrate beyond reasonable doubt, and where the
magistrate being fully conscious of the inherent danger of any
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departure is convinced that in the particular instance the danger [of
the accomplice testimony] has disappeared.104
This provision is similar to the Indian system’s treatment in that it allows the judge to first apply
his own evaluations of the accomplice’s reliability. Thus, the Indian, Kenyan and Ugandan
judicial systems all begin the departure from the second approach, which requires a warning to
the jury, to the third approach, which allows the judge to apply his own assessments.
3. Least Restrictive Requirement: No Accomplice Corroboration
Rule
The final approach to allowing the factfinder to assess the credibility of the accomplice
witness is to allow the judge to determine whether there is a need for an accomplice warning.
Under this approach, the judge makes his own assessments of the credibility of the accomplice
witness and uses his discretion to determine reliability. Where the judge determines that the
witness may be unreliable, he must instruct the jury on the dangers of accepting accomplice
testimony.
The Canadian Supreme Court has adopted this third view, rejecting the notion of a
general accomplice corroboration rule. In R. v. Vetrovec,105 Justice Dickson rejected each
argument concerning the dangers of accomplice testimony stating:
None of these arguments can justify a fixed invariable rule
regarding all accomplices. All that can be established is that the
testimony of some accomplices may be untrustworthy. But this can
be said of many other categories of witness. There is nothing
inherent in the evidence of an accomplice, which automatically
renders him untrustworthy. To construct a universal rule singling
out accomplices, then is to fasten upon this branch the law of
evidence a blind and empty formalism.106
104
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Thus, the court chose to follow a more flexible rule to accommodate the specific circumstances
of each case.107
As an alternative to the accomplice corroboration rule, the Court suggested that the trial
judges should first evaluate the trustworthiness of the accomplice, placing him in one of two
categories, (1) the genuinely motivated accomplice and (2) the self-interested accomplice.108
The judge is only required to give an accomplice instruction where he determines that the
witness falls into the latter category.109 The Court stated:
The trial judge might better direct his mind to the facts of the case,
and thoroughly examine all the factors, which might impair the
worth of a particular witness. If, in his judgment, the credit of the
witness is such that the jury should be cautioned, then he may
instruct accordingly. If, on the other hand, he believes the witness
to be trustworthy, then, regardless of whether the witness is
technically an ‘accomplice’ no warning is necessary.110
The court concluded that there is no special accomplice category. “An accomplice is to be
treated like any other witness testifying at a criminal trial and the judge’s conduct, if he chooses
to give his opinion, is governed by the general rules.”111
Currently, Canada is the only jurisdiction to hold that no accomplice warning or
corroborating evidence is required in conjunction with the admission of accomplice testimony.
On the other hand, in jurisdictions which follow the second approach, such as England and
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Australia, reform movements advocate the adoption of the principles behind the Canadian
approach.
In England, reform movements propose the use of another general witness credibility
warning, which was applied in R. v. Beck.112 The Beck warning is applied where the nonaccomplice witness has a substantial amount of inside knowledge or where “the witness may
have an axe to grind or something to gain in terms of his own prosecution or sentence from
painting as black a picture as possible of the accused.”113 The Beck warning differs from the full
accomplice warning in that it is a less formal, less complex instruction. It is similar to the
accomplice warning because the judge explains in his instructions about the possible motivations
of the witness.114 One suggestion in terms of reforming the rules of accomplice testimony is to
allow the judge to give a “Beck-type warning about all witnesses of the type whose testimony
may be suspect,”115 including accomplices, when appropriate.
Additionally, the Australian Law Reform Commission has proposed that “a warning
about doubtful evidence should be given to the jury either at the judge’s discretion or where a
party so requests and there are no good reasons for refusing to do so.”116 This suggestion, if
adopted, would allow the accomplice testimony to be assessed first through the judge’s
discretionary filter. The judge may make his own assessments based on observing the
accomplice witness and taking into account the substance of his testimony, specifically against
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other evidence. If the judge determines that the witness is or may be unreliable, he may warn the
factfinder accordingly.
The reform movements have proposed that there should be no distinct category
presuming unreliability for accomplice testimony. Under this view, the judge has the discretion
to assess the credibility of the witness and may instruct the jury where he believes the witness is
unreliable or where the reliability of the accomplice witness may be at issue.
iii. Nature and Type of Corroboration
Regardless of whether corroboration is required, all common law jurisdictions may
consider corroboration where it is offered. In theory, corroboration only supports a witness’
testimony and favors reliability.117 Therefore, corroboration will always strengthen an
accomplice’s testimony.118 However, the remaining issue is, what constitutes corroboration.
There are two views concerning the definition and nature of corroboration, as applied to
accomplice testimony. Corroboration, in its stronger sense, requires “some independent
evidence of the defendant’s participation in the crime.”119 The second view refers to
corroboration in a weaker sense, requiring that the corroborating evidence “strengthens the
credibility of the witness without independently implicating the accused as to the offense.”120
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1. Corroboration Implicating the Accused
The first view, which requires corroboration implicating the accused, concedes by both
the accomplice and the court, that the accomplice was involved in the crime and knew all the
facts.121 Under this view, corroboration is defined as “evidence of any material circumstance
tending to connect the accused with the crime and to implicate him in it.”122
The corroborative evidence must show from an independent source some material fact
tending to show not only that the crime has been committed, but also that the defendant
committed it.123 The evidence must legitimately tend to connect the defendant with the
commission of the crime, but does not need to corroborate every part of the testimony.124 Under
this approach, evidence showing that the witness was telling the truth about the details of the
crime does not satisfy the corroboration requirement because it does not lead to the inference that
the accomplice was telling the truth about the defendant’s participation in the crime.125
In the English judicial system, the Court of Criminal Appeal in Baskerville, held,
Evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony, which
affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with
the crime. In other words, it must be evidence which implicates
him, that is, which confirms in some material particular not only
the evidence that the crime has been committed, but also that the
prisoner committed it.126
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The court found that evidence satisfying the corroboration rule must (1) be independent of the
suspect witness, and (2) implicate the accused.127 In a later decision, the court clarified that the
test for corroboration does not have two prongs; “credibility and corroborative evidence do not
have to be separately established.”128
The English courts have also explained that corroboration can be cumulative.129 In R. v.
Clegg,130 the court reiterated this point by stating, “The nature of the evidence required in
corroboration need only ‘tend’ to connect an accused with the crime. It need only be evidence
‘which makes it more likely that the accused is guilty.’”131 The court explained that
corroboration is often provided “by a combination of pieces of circumstantial evidence, each
innocuous on its own, which together tend to show that the defendant committed the crime.”132
The Baskerville133 opinion also restricted the definition of corroborative evidence by
finding that because “corroboration must be by some evidence other than that of an accomplice
… one accomplice’s evidence is not corroboration of the testimony of another accomplice.”134
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The High Court of Australia adopted the English approach, in Doney v. The Queen.135
The Australian court explained that corroborative evidence “confirms, supports, or strengthens
other evidence in the sense that it renders other evidence more probable.”136 The court explained
that where corroboration of the evidence of an accomplice is involved, it must connect or tend to
connect the accused with the crime charged.137 It must show or tend to show that the
accomplice’s testimony stating the accused committed the crime is true, “not merely that the
crime has been committed but that it was committed by the accused.”138 The Australian Court in
Doney allowed corroboration in the form of circumstantial evidence, but explained that
circumstantial evidence can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt only if all other reasonable
hypotheses are excluded.139 Finally, the court stated:
It is not necessary that corroborative evidence, standing alone,
should establish any proposition beyond reasonable doubt. In the
case of an accomplice’s evidence it is sufficient if it strengthens
that evidence by confirming or tending to confirm the accused’s
involvement in the events as related by the accomplice.140
Thus, the Australian High Court found that corroboration must implicate the accused; however,
it need only corroborate a part of the accomplice’s testimony, not the entirety.
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2. Corroboration Bolstering the Credibility of the Accomplice
The second view regarding the nature of corroboration theorizes that the witness’
testimony is sufficiently corroborated and his credibility restored “where his testimony is
strengthened by the confirmation of some of the particulars of his story.”141
In the Swaziland court system, the proviso of § 237 of the Criminal Procedure and
Evidence Act “does not make corroboration implicating the accused a condition precedent for
conviction.”142 Thus, Swaziland law constitutes a departure from English practice in regard to
the evidence of an accomplice. Although Swaziland courts have required corroboration in order
to sustain a conviction, the required corroboration need only provide independent evidence that
the crime has been committed.143 This reading is also supported by a South African case,144
which held that a similar proviso “could not be read as referring to proof that ‘the offence has …
been actually committed’ by the accused.”145
The Canadian Supreme Court has pointed out that corroboration implicating the accused
diverges from the original purpose of requiring corroboration, which is to determine the
credibility of the accomplice witness. Judge Dickson argues,
The reason for requiring corroboration is that we believe the
witness has good reason to lie. We therefore want some other piece
of evidence, which tends to convince us that he is telling the truth.
Evidence, which implicates the accused, does indeed serve to
accomplish that purpose but it cannot be said that this is the only
sort of evidence, which will accredit the accomplice. This is
141
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because, as Wigmore said, the matter of credibility is an entire
thing, not a separable one:
[W]hatever restores our trust in him personally restores it as a
whole; if we find that he is desiring and intending to tell a true
story, we shall believe one part of his story as well as another;
whenever, then, by any means, that trust is restored, our object is
accomplished, and it cannot matter whether the efficient
circumstance related to the accused's identity or to any other
matter. The important thing is not how our trust is restored, but
whether it is restored at all.146
Accordingly, corroborative evidence need not go to the actual commission of the offence. All
that is necessary is that there should be corroboration in some material respect in order that the
court may be satisfied that the accomplice is a reliable witness.
The Canadian Supreme Court in Vetrovec criticized Baskerville as too narrow and
unsound in principle, stating that the purpose of corroboration is that “the accomplice is a
potentially untrustworthy witness. Therefore, any evidence which tends to show the witness is
telling the truth should be capable of rehabilitating his credibility.”147 The court concluded by
stating “[the accomplice’s] credit is an entire thing, not a separable one.”148
D. Accomplice Testimony in Civil Law Jurisdictions
Accomplice testimony in civil law systems is treated entirely different from that in the
common law systems. While the basic definition of accomplice remains the same as in common
law systems, one major difference between the common and civil law systems in general, is that
in the civil law systems the judge is both the trier of law and fact.149 For example, the Italian
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Constitutional Court has stated that in “order to discover the truth, trial judges as the triers of
fact, need to be able to evaluate and take into account as much of the information they happen to
learn about during the trial.”150 Although the Italian legal system clearly favors the admissibility
of evidence, there are limitations and exclusionary rules that must be applied to the evidence. On
the other hand, such exclusionary provisions and warnings to the factfinder do not have the same
effect in the Italian civil law system as they do in other common law systems.
In the Italian judicial system, the trial judge handles both the findings of law and fact,
including the admissibility of evidence.151 Therefore, where a decision is made on admissibility,
the judge hears the evidence and determines the issue. Unlike the common law jury system
where the jury is isolated from the inadmissible evidence, in the Italian system the judge is not
insulated from hearing potentially inadmissible evidence. However, the judge in the civil law
system also must give a written opinion on his reasons for determining guilt or innocence, which
is not a characteristic of the common law system.152 The exclusionary rules in the Italian system
are not aimed at insulating the trier of fact from the impact of the inadmissible evidence.
One significant exclusionary rule governing accomplices in the Italian system applies to
co-defendant testimony, which is considered untrustworthy and is thereby excluded.153 Outside
of this exclusion, the Italian trial judge is compelled to admit all evidence presented by the
parties, unless it is inadmissible or clearly superfluous.154
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Other jurisdictions deal with accomplice evidence more specifically in their rules of
criminal procedure. In Norway, the statute on criminal procedure provides that accomplice
witnesses, along with defendants and children do not take an oath prior to testifying.155 The
ICTR statute only provides that children are not to take an oath prior to testifying.156 This
prohibition by the ICTR against allowing children to take an oath, in conjunction with the
omission of applying this rule to accomplice testimony suggests that the Chamber will not view
accomplice testimony as per se unreliable.
Another major difference in the two systems of law is that many civil law systems, such
as Germany and Italy operate under compulsory prosecution.157 In these jurisdictions the
discretion to charge a perpetrator lies with the court, whereas in the common law system the
discretion lies with the prosecutor.158 This difference is significant because it reduces the
dangers of accepting accomplice testimony for civil law systems. In common law systems, the
prosecution may offer immunity, a lesser charge or a sentence reduction to the accomplice in
exchange for his testimony. The potential danger in making this offer is that the witness may
exaggerate or testify falsely in order to please the prosecutor and secure favorable treatment.
Under the compulsory prosecution of the civil law systems, offers of immunity in exchange for
testimony are not available because any discretion to charge an accomplice with a crime lies with
the judge and not the prosecutor.159 Therefore, the dangers of accomplice testimony are reduced.
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Given the compulsory prosecution in many civil law systems, the number of testifying
accomplices is limited. However, the offer of immunity or sentence reductions for perpetrators
is sometimes authorized by the legislature on a temporal basis and under certain circumstances.
One requirement in Italy and Spain is that the accomplice must be repentant in order to find the
accomplice credible and allow for any immunity.160 “The system favors ‘a complete change in
the individual’s ideology and commitments … and implies… a public rejection of the old life
coupled with the act of repentance.’”161
In the Spanish judicial system, Article 203 of the 1848 Criminal Code, members of secret
societies were exempted from the punishment of deprivation of freedom if they confessed their
membership to the authorities as well as the aims and plans of their associations.162 In the years
to follow, the laws were modified and in 1947, the law established three grounds for the
exemption from punishment:
(1) [T]o withdraw from the commission of a crime before it
has been fully carried out and to denounce it to the
authorities;
(2) [T]o safeguard information which could help the authorities
to capture those involved in crimes of terrorism; and
(3) [T]he rapid collaboration with the authorities which
prevents the commission of a serious crime, when the
collaborator himself has only committed minor crimes.
In the Italian system, the law calls for repentance, dissociation and collaboration with the
authorities in order to be considered a reliable accomplice.163 In 1982, the legislation extended
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the principles of dissociation and collaboration by dividing dissociated terrorists and
collaborators into two separate categories. The categories and their advantages were as follows:
(1) Immunity for terrorists who have committed or attempted
minor crimes;
(2) Reduced penalties for those guilty of more serious crimes,
provided that they dissociate themselves by making full
confessions of all their offences and help to reduce the
impact of these crimes;
(3) Further reductions in penalties for those guilty of more
serious crimes, who make full confessions and who help
police and judicial authorities to obtain crucial evidence for
the identification and capture of those involved or who help
in the exact reconstruction of the offences; and
(4) Still further reduced sentences for terrorists who have
collaborated in a very decisive way.164
In 1987, the Italian legislature introduced a new law favoring an accomplice’s dissociation over
collaboration.165 The law emphasized dissociative repentance and applied to those who had
abandoned their organizations and who in conjunction with this have also admitted to the
activities in which they have partaken.166
In both the Spanish and Italian systems the idea of the repentant accomplice is crucial to
the reliability of his testimony.167 The characteristics of such repentance are strongly linked to
the ideas of dissociation and collaboration.
Despite the compulsory jurisdiction in Germany,
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The prosecuting authorities can get the authorization of the court
not to initiate any criminal action against a person suspected of
certain crimes when the suspect has collaborated with the
authorities to avoid or diminish any danger to the security of
Germany or to the constitutional order.168
There are no constitutional restrictions to the introduction of accomplice witnesses by the state in
the German legal system.169

Accomplice testimony is evaluated according to proportionality.170

This principle refers to the accomplice’s testimony and the crimes he has committed, which are
evaluated against the significance of his testimony and “the probable effect [that] this evidence
will have on the prevention of crime.”171 The significance of accomplice’s evidence “must not
be evaluated quantitatively in the sense of one unsentenced state witness for two sentenced
criminals, but by qualitative criteria.”172 Where the accomplice’s evidence provides the benefit
of a reduced sentence, the evidence must:
Serve to inculpate accomplices who are as or more important that
the [accomplice] himself. Secondly, there must be a certain
proportionality of justice between the crime solved as a result of
the evidence provided and the crime committed by the
[accomplice].173
However, the treatment of accomplices in the German system has been criticized for its lack of
regard for witness credibility and its omission to require corroborating evidence.174
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V.

International Treatment of Accomplice Testimony
In the international judicial forum, courts have combined a number of different rules from

the national jurisdiction to determine the weight to be attached to accomplice testimony. The
international courts have similar traits to both the common and civil law systems and therefore
are justified in combining the different approaches. For example, a judicial panel determines the
findings of facts and law in the international courts, which is similar to the function of the judge
in civil law systems. On the other hand, the international courts share similarities to common
law systems in that they are both adversarial systems, rather than like the civil law inquisitorial
procedure.
The trial chamber in the ICTY discussed the rules governing accomplice testimony in
common and civil law systems before determining its own approach in The Prosecutor v. Kordic
and Cerkez.175 In this case, Witness AT, a senior member of the HVO IV Battalion Military
Police, testified about the role of Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez in the attacks on Bosnian
Muslim civilians in the Lasva River Valley. Witness AT’s testimony informed the Chamber of
the defendants’ attendance at two meetings of the political leadership. He also testified as to the
defendants’ strategy and involvement in the attack on Ahmici.
In response, the defense attacked the credibility of Witness AT “on the grounds that he
was a participant in the attack; and, as such, had been convicted by the Chamber of crimes
against humanity.”176 Thus, the Chamber had to determine the weight to be given to the
testimony of such an accomplice witness.
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The Chamber used a comparative analysis of the different legal systems to determine the
weight, which should be assessed to Witness AT’s testimony. The Chamber began by
recognizing that Witness AT had been convicted of crimes against humanity and had received a
substantial sentence, which was on appeal. The court pointed out that he had not testified at his
own trial, but instead had given a “lying alibi defense and refused even now to admit to any part
in the murder.”177 To rebut the defense’s argument that Witness AT was lying in his testimony
to reduce his sentence, Witness AT testified that “he was not trying to evade his responsibility
but to alleviate his conscience and tell the truth.”178 Subsequently, Witness AT withdrew the
alibi he had given at his own trial as untrue.
In determining Witness AT’s credibility and the weight that his testimony should be
given, the Chamber looked to the evidentiary standards applied in other jurisdictions. It stated,
“In common law jurisdictions the evidence of Witness AT would be regarded as that of an
accomplice and would be treated with great caution.”179 The court referenced the former English
standard that required corroboration of accomplice evidence. It acknowledged that even though
corroboration is no longer a requirement in the English system, “juries must have the danger of
relying on the witness’s evidence pointed out to them if there is a risk that it is tainted by an
improper motive ... it is important that the witness’s potential fallibility and ulterior motives are
put squarely before the jury.”180 However, the Chamber also pointed out that in the modern
English system, a jury may convict on uncorroborated accomplice testimony.181
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The Chamber also considered Italian law in its analysis, stating the Italian system accepts
the evidence of pentiti or crown witnesses, but requires such evidence to meet a number of
safeguarding factors.182 The Chamber also considered the European Commission of Human
Rights’ conclusion that:
There had been no violation of the right to a fair trial under Article
6 of the ECHR in a case in which a ‘supergrass,’ [an accomplice]
had given evidence, but where a number of elements indicated that
the defendant had been given a fair hearing. The trial court was
aware of the particular nature of the evidence; the jury had been
given notice of the difficulties involved in the assessment of its
reliability; the defense had been given full opportunity to challenge
the evidence; and, it was not the exclusive basis for the court’s
decision.183
The Chamber added, “It is a matter of common sense that a witness with an interest to serve, (or
have his sentence reduced) may seek to inculpate others and exculpate himself.”184 However, it
also reasoned that the danger of such a motivation does not render a witness incapable of telling
the truth.
The Chamber concluded that it was necessary to consider each witness’ evidence and all
the circumstances, “particularly the extent to which evidence is confirmed.”185 In this case there
was no direct evidence corroborating Witness AT’s testimony, nor supporting his account of the
meeting. The Chamber recognized that there was corroborating circumstantial evidence; but it
held that this evidence alone was not enough to sustain a conviction in the case.186 The
circumstantial evidence that the Chamber considered corroborating evidence included:
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(1) The events of the attack on Ahmici followed the plan Witness AT
described;
(2) No such plan could have been put into operation without prior meetings
and without political approval; and,
(3) No meeting of this importance in the Lasva Valley would have taken place
without Kordic present.187
In addition to the circumstantial evidence, the Chamber also considered that the
credibility of Witness AT was supported by the manner of his testimony. The Chamber was able
to observe Witness AT’s demeanor first-hand, while he testified. The judges were also able to
hear his testimony both on direct and cross-examinations. The Court found that, “He gave a
coherent, fluent account. He was not shaken on cross-examination.”188 It concluded that the
evidence against Witness AT did not make his testimony unbelievable.189
The Chamber found that it was satisfied that Witness AT did tell the truth about the
preparations for the Ahmici attack, including the meeting and the subsequent briefings. It is
important to note here that the Trial Chamber had separated the elements of Witness AT’s
evidence to the separate accounts for which the defendants were indicted.190 Additionally, in
finding that some of Witness AT’s testimony was inconsistent and unsupported by corroborating
evidence, the Trial Chamber discarded the inconsistent testimony as applied to the relative
indictments.
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VI.

Conclusion

The potential risks that follow the admission of accomplice testimony may be higher in
the ICTR than in another jurisdictions given the gravity of the crimes charged and their
accompanying punishments. On the other hand, it may be over-reaching exclusionary grounds to
make the generalization that all accomplices are not credible. Regardless of the outcome of this
issue, the ICTR should apply the definition of accomplice broadly, according to the purpose of
the principle rather than following the technical requirements of the definition.
The Chamber has the benefit of being the finder of both law and fact, as in the civil law
system. Therefore, it will be able to hear all the testimony and determine probative value and
reliability of accomplice testimony. However, it should not apply this cautionary evaluation to
accomplices only. The Chamber must recognize that many of the witnesses involved in the cases
before the tribunal possess biases and applying a cautionary accomplice rule to accomplices only
may make an improper generalization.
In determining the weight to be attached to the accomplice testimony, the Chamber may
use corroborating evidence to support its finding. Regardless of whether the Chamber requires
corroboration in order to sustain a conviction, corroborative evidence only strengthens an
accomplice’s testimony. However, where there is no corroborating evidence and a judicial panel
is the finder of fact, the panel should be well aware of the dangers of accomplice testimony. In
such cases, a rule requiring corroboration may not be necessary. Where the judicial panel
functions as both the finder of law and fact, such as in the ICTR, the Chamber is able to observe
the demeanor of the accomplice witness and hear him testify on both direct and crossexamination. The Chamber may also employ any of the supporting evidence, whether direct or
circumstantial, to serve as corroboration. Although it may choose to remind itself of the dangers
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accompanying accomplice testimony, the Chamber is competent to make its own assessment of
the value and weight, which should be assessed to the testimony, without a corroboration
requirement.
The ICTR has repeatedly held that it is free to assess its own weight to any piece of
evidence. Given this holding, the Chamber will most likely follow the ICTY’s decision in
Kordic and Cerkez, where the ICTY Trial Chamber observed the accomplice witness’ testimony
and accepted it as reliable. The Chamber supported its finding of reliability with some
circumstantial evidence supporting the witness’ testimony, in conjunction with the witness’
demeanor while testifying. With regard to the factual inconsistencies in the witness’ testimony,
the Chamber rejected the consideration of the inconsistent facts as applied to those charges. The
ICTR Chambers should similarly observe the accomplice witness during testimony and use other
direct or circumstantial evidence to support a finding of reliability. These considerations for
witness demeanor and corroboration safeguard against the dangers of accomplice testimony.
As concluded above, a judicial panel is better equipped and experienced to assess the
credibility of any witness without limitations, such as corroboration or instructions. The judges
who make up the Chamber are experienced in the procedural and cautionary functions of the
judicial process. They have a better understanding of the motivations and potential biases of
witnesses. Therefore, they have the ability to properly assess credibility.
Additionally, the Chamber should subscribe to an open policy on the admission of
accomplice evidence because of the precedent it has set in previous ICTR cases, that it alone can
assess the value of evidence and does not need additional rules and filters, such as a
corroboration rule. Although it is always helpful to support accomplice testimony with
corroboration, the Chamber should admit the accomplice evidence; and while acknowledging the
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dangers of the accomplice testimony, should be free to attach the proper weight in support or
rejection of the credibility of the accomplice witness.
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